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Many law professors teach Criminal Law without any explicit acknowledgment of race and its 
impact on the criminal law. That is how my Criminal Law professor taught the course when I 
was in law school—and that was how I taught Criminal Law when I first started teaching. 
 
Race, however, infuses so many aspects of the criminal justice system that to teach Criminal 
Law without any acknowledgment of race reinforces the fiction that criminal law is race-neutral 
and blind to racial difference—something that is just not true.  
 
In this chapter, I briefly sketch a few places in the substantive criminal law course where law 
professors can include discussion of race to enrich students’ understanding of the law.  
Undoubtedly, there are other places where discussions of race could be introduced.  What is 
presented here is not meant to be exhaustive of all the ways in which race can be discussed in the 
criminal law classroom. Nonetheless, this book chapter should be a useful guide to both law 
professors who want their students to think critically about race in the context of the criminal 
justice system and students who seek to make racial interventions in Criminal Law classes in 




Many professors start their Criminal Law course with a discussion of theories of punishment and 
basic principles of criminal law, including the requirement that the prosecution prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some professors also include the concept of jury nullification when 
discussing basic principles of criminal law.  
 
If one covers the concept of jury nullification, one might want to have students engage Professor 
Paul Butler’s proposal calling for racially based jury nullification. Butler argues that African 
American jurors should engage in jury nullification in cases involving African Americans 
charged with non-violent crimes.3  
 
To make his case, Butler notes that “one-third of African-American young men are under 
criminal justice supervision[,] . . . over half of the women in state prison are African-American, 
and over half of the men in federal and state prisons are African-American.”4 Butler points out 
that their numbers in prison suggest African Americans—who constituted only 12 percent of the 
 
1 Cynthia Lee is the Edward F. Howrey Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School. She 
thanks Casey Matsumoto and Riven Lysander for excellent research and editorial assistance. She also thanks her 
former administrative assistant, Prerna BalaEddy, for administrative and editorial assistance. Finally, she thanks 
Devon Carbado for inviting her to contribute to The Oxford Handbook of Race and Law in the United States. 
2 Edited excerpts from most of the resources discussed in this chapter can be found in CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA P. 
HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2019). If you use any of our edited excerpts, please provide 
proper attribution by citing to our casebook. 
3 Paul D. Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 
(1995); Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 911 (1997). 
4 Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, supra note 3, at 912. 
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total population at the time—are the most dangerous and most immoral people in the United 
States5 when, in fact, many African Americans are in prison for non-violent drug offenses.6  
 
Butler notes that a huge cost of having one out of every three young African American males 
under criminal justice supervision is a “lack of male role models and male income” and “a lack 
of marriage-eligible” men in the African American community.7 To combat this problem, Butler 
urges African American jurors to consider nullifying or voting to acquit in cases involving 
African American defendants charged with non-violent drug offenses.8  
 
One does not have to agree with Butler’s racial jury nullification proposal to recognize its value 
as a pedagogical tool to encourage critical thinking about race and the criminal justice system. If 
one assigns Butler’s work, one can also assign Andrew Leipold’s strong rebuttal to Butler’s 




Many professors teach the void-for-vagueness doctrine in Criminal Law. Under this doctrine, a 
statute that either fails to give ordinary citizens fair notice of what conduct is criminal or gives 
law enforcement officers arbitrary and capricious discretion to arrest individuals violates due 
process.10 A number of United States Supreme Court cases expound on this doctrine and allow a 
discussion of the ways in which implicit racial bias can influence a police officer’s decision to 
arrest.  
 
For example, in Kolender v. Lawson, the Court struck down a California statute that required 
persons loitering or wandering on the streets to (1) present credible and reliable identification, 
and (2) account for their presence, when requested by a police officer under circumstances that 
would justify a Terry stop.11 The individual at the center of this case, Ed Lawson, was an African 
American male with dreadlocks who had been stopped over fifteen times prior to the arrest that 
 
5 Id. at 911–12. 
6 Id. at 920. 
7 Id. at 916. 
8 Id. at 920–21. In his later book, Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice, Butler extended his proposal, urging 
all jurors, not just African American jurors, to vote not guilty whenever any “defendant is accused of possessing 
drugs for his or her own use, or selling a small quantity to another consenting adult.” PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE, A 
HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 72–73 (The New Press 2009). In other words, Butler urged jury nullification in cases 
involving minor non-violent drug possession and sale cases regardless of the race of the defendant or the race of 
the juror. 
9 Andrew D. Leipold, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Rebuttal (Part A), 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 923 (1997). 
10 As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two 
independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand 
what conduct it prohibits; second, it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.” Chicago v. City of Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (finding Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance 
unconstitutionally vague). See also Joshua DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 5.03 (7th ed. 2017) (“The Due 
Process Clause forbids the enforcement of any statute that, due to vagueness in language, ‘vests virtually complete 
discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied [its requirements].’”).  
11 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
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led him to challenge the constitutionality of the California loitering statute.12 Suspecting that the 
main reason he was stopped so often by the police was his race, Lawson challenged the 
constitutionality of the California statute.13 He argued that it gave officers too much discretion, 
and the Supreme Court agreed. Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor explained why the 
statute was unconstitutional:  
 
Section 647(e), as presently drafted and as construed by the state courts, contains 
no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the 
requirement to provide a ‘credible and reliable’ identification. As such, the statute 
vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether 
the suspect has satisfied the statute . . . We conclude § 647(e) is unconstitutionally 
vague on its face because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to 
describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the 
statute.14 
 
Justice O’Connor did not address the role that implicit racial bias may have had in Lawson’s 
being stopped in the first place. Her analysis in the case was thus consistent with her overall 
color-blind jurisprudence.15 A professor interested in calling attention to race, however, could 
use Kolender v. Lawson to highlight the racial implications of vague loitering laws by 
highlighting the way in which implicit racial bias can encourage people in general to associate 
African Americans with crime and police officers in particular to stop Black individuals more 
often than individuals who are not Black.16  
L. Song Richardson’s article, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, helps 
students understand this point. Using the science of social cognition, Richardson explains why a 
well-meaning officer might perceive the behavior of a Black person as suspicious even though 
the officer would not regard the same behavior by a White person as suspicious: 
 
 
12 Leon Lindsay, Can a Person be Free to Wander Without Worry of Arrest?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 12, 1982, at 
3. Lawson was a vegetarian who strongly believed in the benefits of mental and physical fitness and, therefore, 
walked almost everywhere. Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358. 
15 See Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 977–80 (2002) (critiquing Justice 
O’Connor, who wrote the opinion in Florida v. Bostick, for ignoring the fact that Bostick was Black and the two 
officers who searched him were White and noting that in adopting a color-blind position, Justice O’Connor was not 
being race neutral, but was signaling that, in her opinion, race was irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment analysis, 
consistent with her color-blind approach in other cases). 
16 The author purposely capitalizes the words “Black” and “White” except where the words are lower case in 
quotations. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Case for Capitalizing the B in Black: Black and White are Both 
Historically Created Racial Identities—And Whatever Rule Applies to One Should Apply to the Other, ATLANTIC (June 
18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/time-to-capitalize-blackand-white/613159/ 
(https://perma.cc/ER4S-JVUD) (explaining why it is important to capitalize the words “Black” and “White” when 
referring to Black and White people); Lori L. Tharps, The Case for Black With a Capital B, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/the-case-for-black-with-a-capital-b.html?smid=tw-share&_r=1 () 
(explaining that “[w]hen speaking of a culture, ethnicity or group of people, the name should be capitalized.”); 
Brooke Seipel, Why the AP and Others Are Now Capitalizing the 'B' in Black, 




The science of implicit social cognition demonstrates that individuals of all races 
have implicit biases in the form of stereotypes and prejudices that can negatively 
and nonconsciously affect behavior towards blacks. The implicit stereotype 
consists of the cultural stereotype of blacks, especially young men, as violent, 
hostile, aggressive, and dangerous. In the policing context, implicit stereotypes can 
cause an officer who harbors no conscious racial animosity and who rejects using 
race as a proxy for criminality to unintentionally treat individuals differently based 
solely upon their physical appearance. 
 
As a result of implicit biases, an officer might evaluate behaviors engaged in by 
individuals who appear black as suspicious even as identical behavior by those who 
appear white would go unnoticed. In other words, even when officers are not 
intentionally engaged in conscious racial profiling, implicit biases can lead to a 
lower threshold for finding identical behavior suspicious when engaged in by 
blacks than by whites.17 
 
Paul Butler’s essay, Walking While Black: Encounters with the Police on My Street, makes a 
similar point through first person narrative. In this essay, Butler, an African American male law 
professor, recounts the night that he was stopped, questioned, and followed by D.C. police 
officers while he was walking home.18 Students often tell me that Butler’s Walking While Black 
was the most memorable and impactful article they read during the semester. 
 
Another case that illustrates the role of implicit racial bias in the exercise of police discretion is 
the 2009 arrest of African American Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates. In Masculinities, 
Post-Racialism, and the Gates Controversy: The False Equivalence Between Officer and 
Civilian, Frank Rudy Cooper illustrates the discretion inherent in the Massachusetts disorderly 
conduct statute upon which a White police officer relied to arrest Dr. Gates in Dr. Gates’s own 
home after responding to a potential break-in call.19 Cooper goes beyond the obvious racial 
implications of the case to explore the masculinity contest that took place between the officer 
and Dr. Gates. 
 
Another useful reading when covering the void-for-vagueness doctrine is Devon Carbado’s 
Predatory Policing. In this article, Carbado notes how easy it is for police officers to establish 
the requisite probable cause to arrest mostly poor people for violating vague crimes, such as 
loitering, sleeping in a public place, sitting or lying down in a particular public place, camping or 
lodging in a public place, panhandling, storing personal property in a public place without a 
permit, drinking in public, and removing trash from a bin.20 This power to arrest—and 
concurrent power to engage in social control—sets into motion a chain of events that Carbado 
argues leads to mass criminalization of mostly poor Black and brown individuals. 
 
Hate Crimes and the Actus Reus Requirement 
 
17 L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2011). 
18 Paul Butler, Walking While Black: Encounters with the Police on My Street, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at 23. 
19 Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialism, and the Gates Controversy: The False Equivalence Between 
Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. L.J. 1 (2010). 




When Criminal Law professors teach the actus reus requirement, most focus on the voluntary act 
requirement,21 the unconsciousness defense,22 omission liability,23 and the prohibition on status 
crimes.24 In addition, some professors cover the criminal law principle that, as a general matter, 
one cannot be held criminally liable for bad thoughts alone.25 Students studying this principle 
often wonder why it is that a state can punish an individuals for a hate crime, which they might 
see as punishing a person for their hateful thoughts. A professor can address the distinction 
between thoughts and acts by assigning Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the seminal case on hate crimes. 
In this case, the Supreme Court explains that hate crimes are permissible because they punish a 
person for actions motivated by bias, not for hateful thoughts alone.26  
 
Voluntary Manslaughter and the Defense of Provocation 
 
Most Criminal Law professors cover the defense of provocation, also known as the heat of 
passion defense. A defendant charged with murder who argues that he was provoked into a 
passion, can ask the jury to find him guilty, not of murder, but of a lesser offense, like voluntary 
manslaughter, because he killed while in a heat of passion. One arguing provocation must show 
he was spurred to action by legally adequate provocation.  
 
At early common law, legally adequate provocation existed only if the defendant was provoked 
by certain things, including an aggravated assault or battery, mutual combat, an illegal arrest, the 
 
21 As a general matter, to be held criminally liable, one must engage in a voluntary act that causes social harm. See 
Martin v. State, 17 So.2d 427 (Ala Ct. App. 1944) (reversing the conviction of a man who was convicted of being 
drunk on a public highway because the defendant, while admittedly drunk, did not voluntarily appear in public in 
that condition); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.02 [A] (7th ed. 2015) (“Subject to a few limited 
and controversial exceptions, a person is not guilty of a crime unless her conduct includes a voluntary act”); WAYNE 
R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 6.1(c) (3d ed. 2019) (noting that “it is clear that criminal liability requires that the 
activity in question be voluntary”). 
22 See People v. Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956). Decina offers students the opportunity to analyze whether a 
person with epilepsy acts voluntarily if he drives into four schoolchildren during an epileptic seizure.  
23 Ordinarily, one cannot be held criminally liable for an omission or failure to act. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. 
CRIM. L. § 6.2 (3d ed. 2019); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3) (“Liability for the commission of an offense may not be 
based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless . . . the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law 
defining the offense; or . . . a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law.”). One can be held 
criminally liable for an omission if one had a legal duty to act. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 6.2(a) (3d ed. 
2019). A legal duty to act may exist if a status relationship exists that imposes such a duty, the duty is imposed by 
statute or contract, one voluntarily assumes the duty, or one is responsible for creating the peril in the first place. 
See id. § 6.2(a)(1)–(5). 
24 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (“We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted 
[with narcotics addition] as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or 
been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”). 
25 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 6.1 (3d ed. 2019) (noting that “[b]ad thoughts alone cannot constitute a 
crime”). 
26 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
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observation of the commission of a serious crime against a close relative of the defendant, or 
observation of one’s spouse in the act of adultery.27   
 
Virtually every single jurisdiction in the United States has abandoned the early common law 
approach to provocation, replacing it with a reasonable person test. Under this test, the defendant 
must show that a reasonable person in his shoes would have been provoked into a heat of 
passion. Legally adequate provocation is no longer confined to the five categories that were 
recognized at early common law but is defined in reference to the hypothetical reasonable 
person.  
 
One categorical rule from the early common law approach, however, has persisted. Under the 
mere words rule, mere words can never constitute legally adequate provocation. This is because 
the law presumes that a defendant who kills in response to mere words is not reacting the way a 
reasonable person would react. 
 
One could simply tell students about the mere words rule and move on, but the mere words rule 
has an interesting history. It turns out that the rule is not as absolute as it seems at first glance. 
Courts have consistently allowed male murder defendants to argue provocation in cases where 
the only thing that provoked them were mere words by their wives admitting to the commission 
of adultery or suggesting the husband’s sexual inadequacy.28 
 
In light of this gendered history allowing male defendants to argue provocation even when the 
provocation came from mere words, one avenue for fruitful discussion regarding race is the 
question of whether African American defendants charged with murder should be permitted to 
argue provocation if what provoked them was being called the N-word. Camille Nelson has 
argued that Black defendants who have suffered years of racial discrimination and racially 
derogatory insults should be allowed to argue they were reasonably provoked into a heat of 
passion after being called the N-word.29 One can ask one’s students whether they think courts 
should permit African American defendants charged with murdering someone who called them 
the N-word to argue provocation, just as they have done with male defendants charged with 
murdering their wives, even though those defendants were provoked by mere words. It is 
important to remind students that being allowed to make a provocation argument does not mean 
 
27 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §31.07[B][2][a] (7th ed. 2015). It is noteworthy that only husbands 
could benefit from the last category of legally adequate provocation, so perhaps a more accurate way of describing 
this last category would be the observation by a husband of his wife in the act of adultery. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND 
THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 22 (NYU Press 2003) (discussing a Texas case in 
which the Court of Appeals refused to apply a Texas statute that made homicide justifiable when a husband killed 
a man upon finding that man in the act of adultery with the husband’s wife to a woman who was charged with 
murder for shooting and killing her husband’s mistress after catching them in the act of adultery).  
28 See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976) (finding that a defendant who strangled his wife to death after she 
“sexually arous[ed] him and taunt[ed] him into jealous rages” was entitled to a provocation instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter); People v. Ambro, 505 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), overruled by People v. Chevalier, 
544 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. 1989) (finding that a defendant who stabbed his wife to death after “she informed him of her 
adultery and then goaded him to kill her” was entitled to a provocation instruction on voluntary manslaughter). 
29 Camille A. Nelson, (En)raged or (En)gaged: The Implications of Racial Context to the Canadian Provocation 
Defense, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1007, 1053 (2002). 
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one will succeed in convincing the jury that one was reasonably provoked. It simply provides the 




Many criminal law casebooks include State v. Williams.30 In this case, a Native American couple 
was charged with and convicted of manslaughter in the death of their infant child. According to 
the trial court’s findings of facts, the parents had known that their seventeen-month-old child was 
ill but did not realize how sick he was. They simply thought he had a toothache and gave him 
some aspirin, thinking that would help. They did not take the baby to a doctor because they 
feared that the Welfare Department would take him away from them. 
 
At the time this case was decided, the state of Washington allowed a manslaughter conviction on 
a showing of simple or ordinary negligence.31 The Williams case thus allows for a rich discussion 
of whether the young Native American parents (the husband was a twenty-four year old laborer 
with a 6th grade education and his wife was just twenty years old with an 11th grade education) 
acted reasonably in failing to take the child to the doctor. In a Note following this case in our 
Criminal Law casebook, Angela Harris and I invite the reader to consider whether, when trying 
to decide whether a defendant’s actions conformed to those of a reasonable person, the jury 
should consider race, ethnicity, class, age, gender, or level of education.32  
 
To encourage the students to think about the situation from the perspective of a Native American 
parent, we include an excerpt from the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, which reveals that 
around the time the Williams case was decided, approximately 25 to 35 percent of all Native 
American children were separated from their families and placed in foster homes, adoptive 
homes, or institutions.33 The Act specifically notes that “[i]n the state of Washington, the Indian 




30 State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
31 Id. at 1171 (noting that manslaughter is committed if “the death of the victim is the proximate result of only 
simple or ordinary negligence”).   
32 CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA P. HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 398–99 (4th ed. 2019).  
33 INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978, P.L. 95-608 HOUSE REPORT NO. 95-1386 (July 24, 1978). 
34 Id. The Act notes that “the dynamics of Indian extended families are largely misunderstood. An Indian child may 
have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are counted as close, responsible members of the 
family. Many social workers, untutored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be socially 
irresponsible, consider leaving the child with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds for 
terminating parental rights.” Id. The Act also notes, “One of the grounds most frequently advanced for taking 
Indian children from their parents is the abuse of alcohol. However, this standard is applied unequally. In areas 
where rates of problem drinking among Indians and non-Indians are the same, it is rarely applied against non-
Indian parents. Once again cultural biases frequently affect decision making.” Id. One can also assign a podcast 
episode from NPR’s All Things Considered, entitled, Native Foster Care: Lost Children, Shattered Families (Oct. 25, 
2011, 12:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141672992/native-foster-care-lost-children-shattered-families 
[https://perma.cc/CH9V-3B86] (discussing the fact that 32 states are not in compliance with the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1978’s directive that Native American children must be placed with their relatives or tribes except 
in the rarest of circumstances, and that states must do everything it can to keep native families together). 
8 
 
We also include a Note referencing the work of Jennifer Collins who conducted a study of fatal 
neglect cases brought against parents or guardians.35 Collins found that class seemed to affect 
which parents ended up being prosecuted, with preferential treatment being given to middle and 




Another area where one can call attention to race is the law of rape. When I teach rape, I usually 
start by informing my students that, as a historical matter, Black men who engaged in sexual 
intercourse with White women were often charged with and convicted of rape.37 This was in part 
due to social norms that made it taboo for White women to socialize with Black men. It was also 
partially due to deeply entrenched racial stereotypes about Black men as sexual predators.38 
Indeed, before the Supreme Court ruled in Coker v. Georgia that imposing the death penalty for 
the crime of rape violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishments, Black men convicted of raping White women received the death penalty more 
often than White men convicted of raping White women, Black men convicted of raping Black 
women, and White men convicted of raping Black women.39 
 
In addition to our long history of seeing Black men as sexual predators, our country also has a 
long history of disbelieving Black women when they have been raped, stemming from 
stereotypes about Black women as being overly promiscuous.40 Indeed, these kinds of 
stereotypes likely contributed to the ability of White slave masters and their sons to rape their 
Black female slaves with impunity.41 Highlighting this history provides important historical 
context for law students studying the law of rape. 
 
35 CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA P. HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 400-–01 (4th ed. 2019).  
36 Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting Negligent Parents, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
807, 809, 831–32 (2006). 
37 ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, REDEFINING RAPE: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE ERA OF SUFFRAGE AND SEGREGATION 272, 288 (Harv. Univ. 
Press 2013) (observing that “[f]or most of American history, rape had been defined either in law or through 
practice as a crime committed largely by African American men against chaste white women” and noting that 
“[d]uring the decade after World War II, for example, African American men in Chicago were over five times more 
likely than white men to be prosecuted for rape; when convicted, they received longer sentences”).  
38 See Angela Y. Davis, Rape, Racism and the Capitalist Setting, 9 BLACK SCHOLAR 25, 27 (1978) (discussing the 
fictional image (or myth) of the Black man as rapist).  
39 Angela Davis notes that “of the 455 men executed between 1930 and 1967 for rape convictions, 405 of them 
were black”). Id. at 24. See also BARRETT J. FOERSTER, RACE, RAPE, AND INJUSTICE: DOCUMENTING AND CHALLENGING DEATH 
PENALTY CASES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 72–73 (2012) (describing a 1966 multistate survey that examined 1,238 rape 
convictions from seven states and found that “of the blacks convicted of raping white women, 36 percent were 
sentenced to death” while “[o]f the defendants in other racial combinations, only 2 percent received death 
verdicts”). Foerster notes that the study found that “Black defendants whose [rape] victims were white were 
eighteen times more likely to be sentenced to death than the [rape] defendants in other racial combinations.” Id. 
at 70, 73.  
40 See supra Davis, note 38, at 27 (noting that “[t]he fictional image of the black man as rapist has always 
strengthened its inseparable companion: the image of the black woman as chronically promiscuous”).  
41 See Osagie K. Obasogie, Anything But a Hypocrite: Interactional Musings on Race, Colorblindness, and the 
Redemption of Strom Thurmond, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 451, 451, 473–74 (2006) (noting that “[b]oth the law of 




The Doctrine of Self-Defense 
 
Another area where one can incorporate race into the criminal law curriculum is the doctrine of 
self-defense. Most criminal law casebooks include the case of Bernhard Goetz, a White man who 
was charged with attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and unlawful possession of 
a firearm after shooting four Black youths on a subway after two of them approached and asked 
him for five dollars.42 Goetz later confessed to the police that his intent was to murder the 
youths. Despite strong evidence against him, Goetz was acquitted of all the charges except an 
unlawful possession of a firearm charge.  
 
One can use the Goetz case to discuss how attorneys can covertly play on racial stereotypes. 
According to George Fletcher, who observed the trial, Goetz’s attorneys referred to the African 
American male victims as “savages,” “predators,” and “vultures,” which were code words to 
convey to the jury that the Black youths were criminals preying on innocent law-abiding citizens 
like Goetz.43 Goetz’s defense attorneys also received permission from the judge to reenact the 
subway shooting scene, ostensibly to show the jurors the path of the bullets. Fletcher notes that 
the defense chose four large young Black men from the volunteer patrol group Guardian Angels 
to play the Black youth who were shot by Goetz, suggesting that the real purpose of the 
reenactment was to convey to jurors that Goetz’s fear of the four Black youth was reasonable.44  
 
When discussing self-defense, one can also use the more contemporary case involving Trayvon 
Martin, the unarmed African American teenager who was shot and killed by George Zimmerman 
in 2012. Before the shooting, Zimmerman had called 911 to report what he thought was 
suspicious activity. The dispatcher asked Zimmerman if he was following the suspicious person. 
When Zimmerman responded affirmatively, the dispatcher told him, “Okay, we don’t need you 
to do that.”45   
 
Martin, who was unarmed, had been talking on his cell phone with his girlfriend when 
Zimmerman began following him in his car. Martin ran away from Zimmerman, who got out of 
his car to pursue Martin on foot. A scuffle ensued. Zimmerman claimed Martin punched him, got 
him on the ground, and sat on top of him. Zimmerman told police he shot Martin because he 
feared Martin was reaching for his gun and was going to kill him. Zimmerman’s gun, however, 
was hidden inside the back waistband of his pants, calling into question Zimmerman’s claim of 
self-defense.46 If Zimmerman was lying on the ground with Martin on top of him, as Zimmerman 
 
that [former Senator Strom] Thurmond statutorily raped and/or sexually assaulted [Carrie] Butler,” a teenage maid 
in Thurmond’s parents’ home who was likely 15 years old when Thurmond first had sexual relations with her). 
42 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). 
43 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 206 (U. Chi. Press 1988) (noting 
that Goetz’s attorney Barry Slotnick referred to the Black youth as “the predators” on society, “vultures,” and 
“savages,” in a covert appeal to racial bias). The jury found Goetz guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the 
third degree, but not guilty on all of the other charges. Id. at 198. 
44 Id. at 206–07. 
45 Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Racial Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 
N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2013). 
46 LISA BLOOM, SUSPICION NATION: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE TRAYVON MARTIN INJUSTICE AND WHY WE CONTINUE TO REPEAT IT 58–
60 (Counterpoint Press 2014).  
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claims, it would have been impossible for Martin to see Zimmerman’s gun, let alone reach for it, 
unless Zimmerman had taken the gun out and pointed it at Martin. At that moment, Martin would 
have reasonably feared for his life and trying to grab the gun from Zimmerman would have been 
a reasonable action in self-defense. 
 
The Martin case can be used to discuss the various ways in which racial bias can influence legal 
decision makers, including police officers deciding whether to arrest, prosecutors deciding 
whether to charge, and jurors deciding whether to convict. More specifically, one can invite 
students to consider how racial stereotypes about Black men as dangerous, violent criminals can 
influence legal decision makers evaluating a defendant’s claim of self-defense.  
 
To enhance this discussion, one can also inform one’s students about social science research over 
the last several decades demonstrating that Black individuals are associated with dangerousness, 
violence, and criminality. In one study, for example, participants observed two men involved in a 
heated verbal altercation that ends when one man shoves the other man. When the shover was 
Black and the man being shoved was White, 75 percent of the participants thought the shove was 
“violent,” while only 6 percent characterized it as “playing around.”47 In contrast, when the 
shover was White and the man being shoved was Black, 42 percent of the participants described 
the shover’s actions as “playing around” and only 17 percent characterized the White man’s 
shove as “violent.”48 The association of Black persons with danger and violence is so pervasive 
that many shooter bias studies have found that individuals are quicker to “see” a weapon in the 
hands of a Black person than they are to see a weapon in the hands of a White person, and that 
individuals will even “see” a gun in the hands of a Black person who is holding an object that is 
not a weapon.49  
 
A professor wanting to highlight racial justice issues relating to the doctrine of self-defense 
might assign an excerpt from Addie Rolnick’s Defending White Space.50 In this insightful article, 
Rolnick reveals the ways in which modern self-defense law reinforces racial subordination and 
helps maintain White residential segregation.51 Aya Gruber’s Race to Incarcerate: Punitive 
Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your Ground is another article one might consider 
assigning.52 Gruber examines the history behind passage of Florida’s stand your ground law and 





47 Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of 
Stereotypes of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 595 (1976). 
48 Id. 
49 Cynthia Lee, Race, Policing, and Lethal Force: Remedying Shooter Bias with Martial Arts Training, 79 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (2016) (examining shooter bias studies). 
50 Addie C. Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 Cardozo L. Rev. 1639 (2019). 
51 Id. at 1690 (arguing that expanded self-defense laws “carve out the possibility for legalized lethal violence 
against people who appear ‘out of place’ and also create space for White residents to enact lesser forms of 
violence on their Black neighbors under cover of the same fear.”). 




When teaching Criminal Law, most professors cover the traditional criminal law defenses, 
including self-defense, defense of others, imperfect self-defense, necessity, duress, insanity, the 
defense of provocation, and voluntary intoxication. In addition to these traditional criminal law 
defenses, a professor who wants to incorporate race into the criminal law curriculum can assign 
materials on what some call the “Black Rage” defense. As Paul Harris explains in his book, 
Black Rage Confronts the Law, the Black Rage defense “is not an independent, freestanding 
defense.”53 Rather, the concept of Black Rage “merges racial oppression with more conventional 
criminal defenses.”54 
 
An excerpt from Harris’ book would be a good way to introduce students to the Black Rage 
defense. Harris explains how this defense was used in the case of Damian Williams and Henry 
Watson, two African American men charged in the beating of Reginald Denny, a White truck 
driver. On April 29, 1992, protests and riots broke out in many cities following the acquittal of 
four White police officers who had been caught on video brutally beating Rodney King, an 
unarmed Black man who was not physically resisting or posing any threat to the officers on all of 
the main charges against them.55  
 
As Harris explains, that day, more than two thousand people had gathered to protest the acquittal 
in South Central Los Angeles. There was a confrontation between police and protestors at the 
intersection of Florence and Normandie Streets. After the police left, Denny happened to drive 
through that intersection. Some of the protestors threw bricks at the windows of Denny’s truck, 
and as Denny came to a stop, the protesters pulled Denny from his truck and beat him. A 
television helicopter videotaped Damian Williams smashing a brick against Denny’s head and 
Henry Watson pressing his foot on Denny’s neck as Denny lay on the ground.56 
 
Williams and Watson were charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and mayhem, 
among other offenses. At trial, Williams’ attorney, Edi Faal, argued that Williams was not the 
person responsible for the beating. He also argued that even if the jury believed that Williams 
was the perpetrator, they should find him not guilty of the two most serious offenses, attempted 
murder and aggravated assault—both of which carried the possibility of a life sentence—because 
Williams lacked the specific intent to kill Denny. Faal explained that in light of the acquittals in 
the Rodney King case, Williams and others congregated to grieve together and express their 
disappointment in the verdict, and after a confrontation with the police, Williams was so 
consumed with emotion and frustration after experiencing years of discrimination as a Black 
man that when he took out his frustrations on Denny, he was not acting with the kind of 
reflective thought which would give rise to a specific intent to kill.57 
 
Harris reports that “[a]t the end of Faal’s closing argument, supporters in the courtroom stood 
and applauded, some even wept.”58 The jury deliberated for over two weeks. In the end, they 
 
53 PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 4 (NYU Press 1997). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 184–85. The officers were acquitted despite the fact that the beating of the unarmed King while he was 
lying defenseless on the ground had been caught on videotape. Id. at 185. 
56 Id. at 185–86. 
57 Id. at 186–87. 
58 Id. at 188. 
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found Williams not guilty of attempted murder and aggravated assault, and guilty of simple 
mayhem and four misdemeanor assaults.59 Watson was also acquitted of attempted murder and 
convicted of misdemeanor assault.60 The jury deadlocked on the other charges against Watson, 
leading the judge to declare a mistrial on those counts.61 
 
The Cultural Defense 
 
Another way one can incorporate discussions of race and ethnicity into the criminal law 
curriculum is by covering what is commonly called the “Cultural Defense.” There is no free-
standing cultural defense, although some have argued for the establishment of such a defense. 
Defendants who are immigrants and defendants of color sometimes seek to introduce evidence 
about their cultural background to negate an element of the charged offense or mitigate the 
possible punishment. There is no established rule regarding the admissibility of cultural evidence 
in the criminal courtroom. Instead, judges have wide discretion to admit or exclude evidence 
regarding the defendant’s cultural background depending on whether the judge thinks it is 
relevant. 
 
In our Criminal Law casebook, Angela Harris and I include several readings on the cultural 
defense.62 We start with People v. Aphaylath, a case in which a Laotian refugee living in New 
York killed his Laotian wife of one month.63 At his murder trial, the defendant argued he was 
suffering from an extreme emotional disturbance because he believed that his wife preferred her 
ex-boyfriend over him and she had received phone calls from this man, which the defendant 
claimed brought shame upon himself and his family and triggered his loss of self-control. The 
defense tried to introduce expert testimony on the stress and disorientation Laotian refugees 
suffer when they come to the United States, but the trial court barred the testimony on the ground 
that the expert witnesses did not know anything about the defendant or his particular background 
and experiences. On appeal, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction and ordered a new 
trial, finding that the exclusion of the expert testimony was erroneous since an expert witness 
does not have to have personal knowledge about a defendant or the defendant’s particular 
characteristics. This case can be used to start a discussion on whether a defendant’s cultural 
background is a relevant consideration in a criminal case. 
 
In Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a 
Collision Course in Criminal Courts?,64 Holly Maguigan discusses the tension between two 
 
59 Id. at 188–89. 
60 Cynthia Lee, Cultural Convergence: Interest Convergence Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911, 957 
(2007), citing Edward J. Boyer & John L. Mitchell, Attempted Murder Acquittal, Deadlock Wind Up Denny Trial, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at A1. 
61 Id. 
62 LEE & HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2019). For a defense of this casebook against the charge 
that it, along with other traditional criminal law casebooks, does not adequately prepare students for the practice 
of law, see Angela P. Harris & Cynthia Lee, Teaching Criminal Law from a Critical Perspective, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
261 (2009) (responding to Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political History of the 
Criminal Law Course, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 217 (2009)). 
63 People v. Aphaylath, 502 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1986). 
64 Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision 
Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 36 (1995). 
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progressive groups, multiculturalists and feminists, over whether outsider criminal defendants—
people who are not from the dominant culture—should be allowed to present evidence about 
their cultural background. Maguigan notes that multiculturalists will often argue that such 
evidence should be admitted to even the scales of justice in a system that embraces the 
monolithic standards of the dominant culture. On the other hand, many feminists oppose the 
admission of such evidence on the ground that cultural evidence is often used to justify or excuse 
the physical violence by men against women. The Maguigan excerpt is an excellent way to get 
students to talk about these differing views of the wisdom of allowing evidence regarding the 
defendant’s cultural background.  
 
In (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense,”65 Leti Volpp uses the 
Dong Lu Chen case, a case in which a Chinese immigrant used cultural evidence at his murder 
trial to receive a sentence of probation (as opposed to jail time), to critique the use of cultural 
evidence to excuse violence by immigrant men against immigrant women. Volpp explains that 
the Chen family immigrated to the United States in September 1986. Initially, Dong Lu Chen 
worked as a dishwasher in Maryland while his wife, Jian Wan, and their three children lived in 
New York. Chen began suspecting that Jian Wan was being unfaithful when she refused to have 
sex with him during one of his visits to New York. In June 1987, Chen moved to New York. In 
August of that year, he asked Jian Wan if she was seeing other men and she admitted that she 
was. In September, Chen told Jian Wan he wanted to have sex with her, but she declined and told 
him, “I won’t let you hold me because I have other guys who will do this.” Chen claimed that 
when she said this, his head became dizzy. When Jian Wan admitted that she had been cheating 
on him “for three months,” he hit her head several times with a claw hammer before passing out. 
 
At his murder trial, Chen’s defense attorney presented an anthropologist, Burton Pasternak, to 
provide evidence about Chen’s cultural background. Pasternak testified that it would not be 
unusual for an ordinary Chinese man to react violently if he found out his wife was being 
unfaithful. Distinguishing East Asian Chinese culture from Western American culture, Pasternak 
testified that it could be expected that a Chinese man would react more violently than someone 
from “our” society. Volpp notes that “the distinction [Chen’s attorney] and Pasternak draw 
between ‘American,’ ‘someone from our own society,’ and ‘Chinese’ implies that ‘Chinese’ and 
‘American’ are two utterly distinct categories: ‘American’ does not encompass immigrant 
Chinese.”66 Volpp points out that when pressed, Pasternak “admitted he could not recall a single 
instance in which a man in China killed his wife or having ever heard about such an event, yet he 
suggested that this was accepted in China.”67 Volpp points out that the defense strategy rendered 
Jian Wan Chen invisible. She was presented only “as a dead body and as a reputed ‘adulteress,’ 
bringing a ‘stain’ upon her husband.”68 
 
There are other resources that one can assign. In Individualizing Justice Through 
Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma,69 Doriane Lambelet Coleman provides summaries of 
 
65 Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the “Cultural Defense,” 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1994). 
66 Id. at 66. 
67 Id. at 70. 
68 Id. at 74–75. 
69 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals’ Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1093 (1996). 
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several additional cases in which the defendant used cultural evidence in his or her defense. She 
then invites debate over how to resolve what she calls the Liberals’ Dilemma: how to balance 
“the defendant’s interest in using cultural evidence that incorporates discriminatory norms and 
behaviors” against “the victims’ and potential victims’ interests in obtaining protection and relief 
through a non-discriminatory application of the criminal law.”70 In A Justification of the Cultural 
Defense as Partial Excuse, Alison Dundes Renteln, the author of The Cultural Defense,71 offers 
several arguments in favor of the establishment of an official cultural defense.72  
 
Guerilla Guides to Law Teaching 
 
I would be remiss if I failed to mention the Guerilla Guide to Teaching Criminal Law, written by 
Jocelyn Simonson and Amna Akbar in 2016, part of the Guerilla Guides to Law Teaching 
project.73 
 
Among other things, Simonson and Akbar suggest that Criminal Law professors introduce the 
concept of abolition of the carceral state as a framework through which students can “question 
the core assumptions about the relationship between incarceration, retribution, and utilitarianism, 
and to take seriously the scale of human devastation wrought by incarceration.”74 Simonson and 
Akbar recommend that Criminal Law professors bring in “local organizers and movement folks 
to talk about their work on policing and mass incarceration.”75 They suggest that professors also 
“[b]ring in the voices and experiences of those directly impacted by the criminal justice system: 
those arrested, prosecuted, incarcerated.”76 They urge Criminal Law professors to “[t]alk about 
race, gender, and class as important dimensions of criminal justice that must be named, 
understood, and debated.”77 They also suggest that Criminal Law professors “[t]ake students to 
local criminal court to observe [court proceedings]” and “[s]how documentaries that provide a 
larger frame for the problems with criminal justice.”78 They suggest assigning “narrative texts on 
the criminal justice system,” such as Bryan Stevenson’s book, Just Mercy: A Story of Justice and 
Redemption.79 They also suggest teaching misdemeanors and dedicating at least one full class to 
the subject of police violence as a complement to the unit on self-defense.80 
 
70 Id. at 1097. 
71 ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (Oxford Univ. Press 2004). 
72 Alison Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 
437 (1983). 
73 Guerilla Guide to Teaching Criminal Law, available at 
https://guerrillaguides.wordpress.com/2016/08/29/crimlaw/ [https://perma.cc/6LC2-8RQY]; Jocelyn Simonson & 
Amna Akbar, Rethinking Criminal Law, L. & POL. ECON. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/10/24/rethinking-
criminal-law/.  
74 Guerilla Guide to Teaching Criminal Law, supra note 73. For an important contemporary work that argues for 
abolition of prisons, one can assign an excerpt from PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017). For 
background on mass incarceration as the new Jim Crow, one can assign an excerpt from MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE 
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012). 










Final Words of Advice 
 
This chapter has suggested various ways law professors can incorporate discussions about race 
into the criminal law curriculum. While it is critically important to acknowledge the role of race 
in the criminal justice system and highlight the various ways racial bias can influence the 
outcomes in criminal cases, it is not necessary to include discussions of race in all of the different 
ways listed in this book chapter. Some professors are likely to face challenges in the classroom 
because of their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and/or gender identity. Professors 
must also try to be sensitive to their audience. If one has students who are likely to presume 
one’s incompetence as a law professor or be hostile to discussions involving race, one may need 
to first establish one’s authority in the classroom. In such cases, I recommend that one start by 
teaching in a traditional fashion and establishing one’s authority in the classroom before 
incorporating discussions about race into the classroom. 
